Executive Compensation and Misconduct: Environmental Harm by Minor, Dylan Blu
Executive Compensation and
Misconduct: Environmental Harm
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Minor, Dylan. "Executive Compensation and Misconduct:
Environmental Harm." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No.
16-076, January 2016.
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:25538424
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
	Executive Compensation and 
Misconduct: Environmental Harm  	
	 	
Dylan Minor 
	
	 	
Working Paper 16-076 
  
Working Paper 16-076 
 
 
Copyright © 2016 by Dylan Minor 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may 
not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
 
Executive Compensation and 
Misconduct: Environmental Harm 
  
Dylan Minor 
Harvard Business School 
 
Executive Compensation and Misconduct: Environmental Harm 
Dylan Minor
Harvard Business School
January 2016
Abstract
We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and misconduct using the setting
of environmental harm. We nd that high powered executive compensation can increase the
odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by
over 100%. We document similar results for the setting of executive compensation and illegal
nancial accounting. Finally, we outline some managerial and policy implications to blunt these
adverse incentive e¤ects.
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The recent passage of the Paris Agreement generated by the 2015 United Nations Climate
Change Conference highlights the global consensus on the importance of limiting environmental
harm. Businesses play a signicant role in environmental outcomes (Dowell, Hart, and Yeung
[2000]). Many businesses are substantial contributors to the problem of climate change. Recog-
nizing the opportunity for business to also be part of the solution, a coalition of global companies
representing over $1 trillion of revenue recently urged companies to become catalysts for reducing
negative environmental impacts.1 Meanwhile, Trucost (2013) made the provocative claim that most
industries produce such a large quantity of environmental toxins that were the rms to be ned
according to law, they would no longer be making a prot. Damage caused by rmsenvironmen-
tal practicesincluding emitting harmful greenhouse gases, polluting local air, and over-using and
polluting freshwaterwould have cost them $12 trillion in 2008 (Jowit, [2010]).
Although regulation can play an important role, it is an incomplete solution; there are already
many laws against such practices, but not all rms comply. In fact, environmental law breaking
often goes unpunished or the companies involved circumvent heavy nes, paying signicantly less
than the original penalty. For example, in 2004, the State Department of Environmental Protection
les lawsuits against Exxon Mobil Corporation for $8.9 billion in damages for the contamination
and loss of use of more than 1,500 acres of natural land and waters in northern New Jersey. Exxon,
however, skirted the almost nine billion dollar penalty, and after eleven years, settled with New
Jersey State for $250 million (Weiser [2015]). In 2013, Wal-Mart pleaded guilty to six counts of
violating the Clean Water Act through illegal handling and disposal of hazardous materials at its
retails stores across the United States, and was made to pay $81.6 million (U.S. Department of
Justice [2013]). Wal-Mart failed to train its employees on proper hazardous waste disposal, leading
to waste placed in city trash bins or poured into local sewer systems.
Since rms are run by managers, an important driver of rm behavior is managerial incentives
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling [1976], Porter and Van der Linde [1995], Murphy [1999], and Goergen
and Renneboog [2011]). Motivated by these observations, this paper asks a simple question: to
what extent does executive compensation push rms into environmental law-breaking in particular
and misconduct in general?
It is well established that executive compensation induces managers to inuence myriad impor-
tant rm outcomes, such as risk-taking, innovation, and acquisition and divestitures (e.g., Sanders
[2001], Rajgopal and Shevlin [2002], Sanders and Hambrick [2007], and Low [2009]). However, more
recently, critics have suggested that such compensation has led to drastically harmful events, such
as the recent nancial crisis and major oil spills. Indeed, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(2011) claimed that the compensation systems for the "corporate boardroom" regularly incen-
tivized the "big bet" by providing enormous rewards for obtaining nancial gains while providing
few penalties for avoiding losses, thus contributing to the 20072008 nancial crisis. Another dra-
matic example is the environmental disaster by British Petroleum (BP) in 2010. The gure below
1See http://www.dsm.com/corporate/media/informationcenter-pub/2015/04/2015-04-17-open-letter-from-global-
ceos-to-world-leaders-urging-concrete-climate-action.html
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reports the cumulative award of options and stocks for BP CEOs Lord Browne and Tony Hayward,
both of whose careers ended after spectacularly destructive oil spills. In the case of Lord Browne,
shares of stocks, and especially shares of options, reached a pinnacle just before the Prudhoe Bay
oil spill. Following this disaster, Tony Hayward took over as CEO and began with a large number
of options and stock. He would very soon be the executive held responsible after the massive Gulf
of Mexico spill, though he did sell a sizable portion of his options just prior to it. We ask ourselves,
are these examples merely suggestive or do they inform us of something deeper at work?
To answer this question we begin by constructing a simple measure that we call the pay index
P . This index P captures the relative incentives of an executive in terms of upsides and downsides
in potential rm performance through equity compensation composition. We then use this index
to predict both the magnitude and severity of misconduct. To validate the compensation measure
beyond theory, we apply it to the settings of environmental misconduct and nancial accounting
misconduct. We nd that changing a CEOs index P from zero (i.e., 100% of equity pay in stock)
to 1 (i.e., 100% of equity pay in options) results in a CEOs rm facing 42  65% increased odds of
breaking environmental law. In addition, such change in compensation is linked to nearly a 100%
increase in the magnitude of environmental harm, as measured by total government nes.
Not only is environmental law-breaking bad for the environment, but mishaps can also damage
rm value. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Konar and Cohen (2001), Karpo¤ et al. (2005),
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), Flammer (2013), and Krüger (2015) all show that when
environmental concerns for a rm are made public, the rm su¤ers a material loss in market value.
In addition to direct losses, such as regulatory penalties and civil litigation, rms might also su¤er
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substantial losses due to damaged reputations. Although certain types of incentives can provide
positive sustainability outcomes (e.g., see Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim [2013], Ferrell, Liang, and
Renneboog [2015], and Hong, Li, and Minor [2015]), our ndings suggest conventional nancial
incentives can inuence adverse environmental outcomes and may be another important channel
for preserving or damaging rm value.
To validate the index P in an entirely di¤erent setting, we explore the relationship between
compensation structure and the likelihood of suspected accounting misconduct and negative earn-
ings restatements; the ndings for this setting are similar to those in the environmental setting.
We also nd evidence that these e¤ects come at least partially from incentive rather than selection
e¤ects. Finally, we explore the consequences of two policies to potentially ameliorate the negative
e¤ects of high powered incentives.
We see this papers contribution as three-fold. First, we construct and validate, a new (to the
best of our knowledge) compensation index P that measures propensity for misconduct. Second, we
document the e¤ects of executive compensation on the likelihood and magnitude of environmental
harm. Third, we provide some policy recommendations to blunt the adverse e¤ect of executive
compensation.
1 Theoretical Considerations
We begin by constructing our index P and generating several hypotheses. In the online appendix, we
formally derive P: However, here we simply provide the intuition of the measure and its predictions.
We rst motivate our theoretical considerations by example.
Misconduct is often born in a probabilistic fashion. That is, a CEO can choose to pursue
greater prot at the potential expense of increased harm and cost, leaving any downside to chance.
For example, in the case of the BP Prudhoe Bay spill, there was a tradeo¤ for executives: they
could increase prots almost immediately by cutting safety expenditures, but this would increase
the potential of an environmental accident. BP decided to accept the risk of this tradeo¤, which
ultimately resulted in an oil spill. The government ne alone for its Prudhoe Bay spill was $20
million, and additional costs, of course, far exceeded this amount. The primary cause of the spill
was deemed to be poorly maintained pipes. This allegedly arose from BPs dogmatic adherence to
cost-cutting, which was encouraged by the CEOs implementation of cost cutting incentives for top
managers. With roughly 250 of BPs top managers, the CEO created an annual "contract" that was
based on short-run annual prots of each respective managers division.2 Prosecutors estimated
that subsequent lax safety standards saved the rm some $9.6 million.3 Hence, the rm enjoyed
roughly $10 million of almost certain prot but faced the potential of an over $20 million cost.
The next BP CEO, Tony Hayward, was also committed to a policy of shaving costs: almost
2These institutional details can be found in the Fortune magazine article available here:
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/24/bp-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/.
3Associated Press via MSNBC News on 11/29/2007. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22014134/ns/business-
oil_and_energy/t/bp-pleads-guilty-alaska-oil-spill/.
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immediately upon becoming CEO, Howard emailed associates about the importance of continued
cost cutting. Once a CEO decides to risk (more) harmful outcomes e.g., with safety cost-cutting
in exchange for greater prot, it may be only a matter of months until such a strategy increases the
chance of an incident and its magnitude. For example, if pipelines are inspected and maintained
monthly, a CEO may decide to save costs by ordering inspections on a six month basis instead, thus
increasing the liklihood of malfunction which may result in costly or fatal damage. For a di¤erent
example in nancial accounting, it could be that a CEO incepts direct incentives with frontline
managers to encourage aggressive nancial accounting practices, leading to an increased chance of
accounting misconduct and its magnitude.
For an entirely di¤erent setting, consider again the Wal-Mart example in the introduction.
Executives can increase at least near-term prots by dumping toxic waste as regular refuse, as both
hazardous waste disposal fees and training costs are avoided. In this case, environmental harm is
all but certain. However, as in the BP examples, the rms cost for misconduct occurs at some
probability less than one.
More generally, this decision to accept the greater risk of harm for greater prot can be thought
of as a CEO choosing between two strategies, one riskier than the other, but with a greater reward.
The following chart illustrates these options.
For example, consider a rm that is worth some value V0: The CEO can choose a safer strategy
that has an upside of successfully growing the rm to value VSS and if the strategy fails, a downside
of rm value VSF : This strategy can be thought of as the benchmark, or status quo, strategy.
Alternatively, the CEO can choose a project with greater upside VRS ; but some level of downside
VRF that is worse than the downside that accompanies the safer strategy.
A CEO will choose one strategy over the another as a function of her compensation incentives.
For CEOs of large US public rms, most of their compensation is in the form of equity compensation:
company options and stocks. Thus, the nature of equity compensation is expected to be the biggest
incentive driver of CEO decision making. In general, when a CEO is paid in the form of company
stock, they become the residual claimant of her company being equally a¤ected by both increases
and decreases in rm value and will thus weight both potential losses and gains in deciding their
course of action (Murphy [1999] and Zhang et al. [2008]). In contrast, when a CEO is paid in
the form of company stock options, she will only enjoy a nancial return if the rm grows in value
and will experience the same nancial return if the rm does not change in value or loses 50% of
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value.4 Therefore, a CEO will choose one strategy over another as a function of the relative "pull"
of options (i.e., reach for high returns without regards to downside) versus the "pull" of stocks (i.e.,
balance the potential gains and losses).
In light of above, it may seem that responsible rms should only pay their CEOs in the form
of stock. However, options can be a lower cost form of compensation because the rm only has to
pay the CEO if the rm grows in value, where with stock, the CEO is being given some value of
the company whether the rms grows or even shrinks in value. Thus, the rm also has a tradeo¤
in how much stock versus options to o¤er the CEO. In the online appendix, we derive the optimal
mix of stocks and options that the rm will choose. We derive the following compensation pay
ratio, we call index P; to measure this optimal mix:
P =
O
O + S
;
where S is the expected value of stock paid and O is the expected value of options paid.
The greater the index P , the greater the share of equity compensation in optionswhich means
the greater the net pull to take on the larger risk of potential downside and thus harm. Notice that
if we only measure the level of options, this would not be su¢ cient to determine the incentives for
misconduct because we also need to know the degree of o¤setting force from the level of stocks.
This index P captures these net forces in a simple, single metric.
Now given some index P; as shown in the online appendix, a CEO will choose some threshold of
downside value V  such that any potential strategy that has a lower (i.e., worse) downside than V 
would never be chosen, and any strategy with higher downside (i.e., better or less harmful) than
V it would be chosen. The greater the index P; the greater the pull to take on a strategy with
a larger downside, since the CEO internalizes less of the downside. This means that on average
those CEOs with greater P will choose a lower threshold V : Therefore, whenever a CEO chooses
a course of action that fails, there is greater harm and cost on average. This provides our rst
hypothesis for our environmental setting.
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of environmental harm is increasing in index P:
Similarly, when we study nancial accounting misconduct, we should nd that the magnitude
of misconduct is increasing in P: For this setting, the magnitude of misconduct can be measured
by the amount of improperly enhanced earnings.
Hypothesis 2: The magnitude of accounting misconduct is increasing in the index P:
The other dimension of misconduct is its likelihood of a harmful outcome. This can also be
determined once we have xed the CEOs standard of downside V : The CEO will face a variety
of alternatives to the benchmark strategy, with downsides ranging from 0 to VSF : The lower the
downside standard V ; the more often a CEO will choose a strategy with a greater downside than
the benchmark one. This means that on average this CEO will be engaging in more strategies that
4This assumes the options are issued "at the money." Many times options will be issued at an even higher strike
prices than the current stock price, which means that unless the rm grows enough in value there is still no nancial
return to the CEO. That is, the CEO earns zero nancial return at low and negative changes in rm value.
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cause harm when they fail. CEOs with increased P will be choosing lower standard V : Thus, the
odds of a harmful event are increasing in P: This generates our next prediction:
Hypothesis 3: The odds of a harmful environmental event are increasing in P:
For the setting of nancial accounting, the logic is the same: those with greater incentive through
a larger P to enhance prots at the expense of greater downside, will more often choose the
potentially harmful route, which means we more often see harmful events.
Hypothesis 4: The odds of accounting misconduct are increasing in P:
Finally, we consider some possible policies to alleviate the adverse consequences of increased P:
A natural rst policy to consider adding a "stick" or penalty against the CEO when a harmful event
happens. This is in part what a law like Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to achieve: the executives become
more personally accountable for negative events. However, in our setting, adding an executive
penalty does not a¤ect the equilibrium risk-taking. This is because if the executive now faces a
larger penalty for a harmful outcome, the rm can simply o¤set the larger potential executive
penalty with a larger P; thus retaining the rms original preferred level of risk-taking. As long as
the executive penalty is not too severe, there should be little to no e¤ect on the odds of taking on
a strategy with a potentially more harmful downside.
Hypothesis 5: Adding executive penalties for harmful outcomes does not increase the odds of
harmful events.
An alternative policy is to make the rms provision of options more costly. One way to do this
would be through reducing the tax benets of providing options. For example, this is part of what
the accounting rule FAS123R achieved. With the rm trading o¤ the relative costs of providing
options and stocks to its executives, on average, it should provide relatively fewer options. This
outcome would decrease the likelihood of harmful events.
Hypothesis 6:Making options relatively more expensive to provide reduces the odds of harmful
events.
Now we take these predictions to the data.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm
We use the setting of environmental harm as our primary test of executive compensation and mis-
conduct. This environment has several desirable features for this study. First, at least for larger
US rms, environmental failures are relatively easy to capture by means of public disclosure both
in terms of incidence and magnitude. Second, for most large US companies, we can identify com-
pensation data on the rms CEO. Third, environmental incidents, in aggregate, are economically
signicant.
Our particular environmental dataset, CEPD, was compiled by the IRRC. For the period 1996
through 2006, the IRRC aggregated breaches of environmental law for each physical location of a
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rms operation up to the company level. In total, this included the (approximately) top 1,500
US public rms in the United States. MSCI acquired the CEPD dataset and has not increased
the observations beyond 2006. Violations include the breaking of a myriad of environmental laws:
Atomic Energy Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Mining Safety and Health Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act. The CEPD dataset includes both
the incidences of violation for each of these environmental acts, as well as the total government-
imposed nes. A particular incident may induce several violations of environmental law both
multiple violations of a single act, as well as multiple violations of various acts.
We consider the magnitude of the total government ne (i.e., the total nes across all counts of
environmental lawbreaking for an incident) as a proxy for the severity of harm. Government nes
are typically only a fraction of the overall cost of an event. For a dramatic example, BPs Prudhoe
Bay spill induced a $20 million government ne for violating environmental laws. However, BP
also had to pay $25 million in civil costs, $60 million for instituting a new government-mandated
safety program, and some $500 million of construction costs, bringing the nal bill to at least $605
million.5 Hence, for this particular case, the $20 million reported in our CEPD dataset represents
roughly 3:3% of the total cost.
In total, the CEPD includes both large and small violations. The mean government ne for
our data is approximately $223,000. Based on the Prudhoe example above, this would amount to
$6:8 million in total average expenses.6 Only the largest of these failures would be considered an
environmental disaster. However, smaller violations can indicate an increased chance of generating
a larger and more harmful a "tip of the iceberg" signal. If we only considered the most extreme
events, there would be too few for identication. Instead, in our analysis, in addition to considering
any lawbreaking events, we also separately analyze small and large incidences.
We merge the CEPD dataset with COMPUSTAT and Execucomp data to identify rm nancials
and CEO compensation. Firm nancial controls include rm leverage, dened as total debt to total
assets, rm market value, and Tobins Q. For CEO compensation, we obtain the annual value of
options and stock awards. These two values are then used to calculate the index P as identied
from our theory section in equation (6). Finally, as controls, we include a CEOs total annual
compensation and the percent of total compensation paid in the form of equity compensation.
Thus, we are estimating the relationship of the composition of equity compensation conditional on
both the total level of compensation and the fraction of pay devoted to equity compensation.
Although we control for rm invariant environmental factors through rm xed e¤ects, this
does not control for any time-varying environmental e¤ects. To address this, we merge data from
KLD analytics on the environmental-performance ratings of rms. Chatterji et al. (2009) nd that
environmental-performance ratings, as measured by KLD analytics, are important in explaining
5Figures are reported by the Associated Press in The Guardian 5/4/2011, available here:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/04/bp-25m-north-slope-oil-spill
6Unfortunately, there are very few events with su¢ cient data on total expenses incurred for the incident, which is
why we focus on the government nes.
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next years rm environmental failures, as measured by the CEPD database. Thus, we will be
testing whether, conditional on observable environmental outcomes, compensation structure further
explains environmental events. More recently, Servaes and Tamayo (2013) also nd KLD analytics
an important source of CSR data, explaining rm value.
Summary statistics for our primary variables are reported in Table 1. On average, rms expe-
rience an event (i.e., a breach of at least one environmental law in a given year) about 15% of the
time, or about every six years. Firms are also large averaging over $11 billion in market capital-
ization. The average CEO receives about $6 million per annum in total compensation, and about
75% of equity compensation is in the form of options (i.e., index P ). We nd that the correlation
of total equity compensation and total compensation has a correlation of .96, which means most
all of the variation in total compensation comes from the amount of equity compensation, which is
the focus of our study.
2.1.1 Results: Environmental Events
Our primary regression model for analyzing incident rates is a panel logit model with rm xed
e¤ects. Specically, we use
Pr (Eventit = 1) =
1
1 + e Qit
; (1)
where Eventi equals 1 when rm i has broken the law in year t.
Qit = i + 
Oi;t 1
Oi;t 1 + Si;t 1
+Xit;
where i is a xed e¤ect for rm i; and Xit is a matrix of control variables that include year xed
e¤ects and nancial and environmental performance controls outlined in the previous section. The
regressor Oi;t 1Oi;t 1+Si;t 1 is the index P from our theory model and is calculated as the ratio of the
total value of CEO option awards to the total value of CEO option and stock awards at time t  1
for rm i:7 Hence, the coe¢ cient estimate b of  is our primary estimate of interest. Hypothesis 2
predicts that  > 0. Although estimating xed e¤ects is possible in the panel logit setting, to do
so, we must drop observations of rms that never have an event or rms that have an event ever
year. Of the 1; 459 rms in our sample, 3:2% have an event every year and 74:5% never experience
an event during our time series. By rm, the mean number of events across the entire 11-year time
series is 1.3. Conditional on a rm having at least one event, the mean number of events is 3.5
across the 11 years.
In addition to this primary specication, we estimate a linear panel model with rm xed e¤ects.
Although this model must assume the probability of an event is linear in its terms, it allows us to
7Based on personal conversations with o¢ cials at the Environmental Protection Agency and a human resource
consultantcy, it appears that with this t   1 specication, a CEO typically knows her compensation structure 624
months before an event occurs in our CEPD data.
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consider those rms that never or always have an event in our sample. We specify this model thus:
Eventit = i + 
Oi;t 1
Oi;t 1 + Si;t 1
+Xit + eit: (2)
In our rst prediction, we consider the relationship between P and incident rates. We then turn to
our second prediction the relationship between P and the magnitude of events.
2.1.2 Increased P Results in Increased Odds of an Event
We report our baseline specication in Table 2. Column (1) reports results controlling for unob-
served rm heterogeneity and total CEO compensation. The logit estimate of roughly 0:5 can be
converted to an odds ratio format,8 yielding e0:5 = 1: 648 7: This means that if a CEO goes from
receiving all equity compensation in stock (i.e., P = 0) to receiving all equity compensation in
options (i.e., P = 1); her rm will have 64:87% increased odds of facing an environmental incident
the next year. Adding all of the other controls does little to change the relative magnitude and
signicance of the coe¢ cient of interest, as shown in columns (2)(4) :
We next consider our linear panel model with rm xed e¤ects. Table 3 reports coe¢ cient
estimates for this specication. Note that the observations for column (1) are 5; 108 compared with
1; 750 for column (1) in Table 2; this is due to the inclusion of all rms (i.e., adding those rms
that never and always face an event in a given year). As seen in column (1), coe¢ cient estimates
suggest that the probability of an environmental incident increases by approximately 5%: Recall
from Table 1 that the baseline chance of an event is 15%; which means that a CEO going from
equity compensation structure P = 0 to P = 1 results in a 33% increased chance of an event. We
can convert our linear model coe¢ cient estimate to odds in order to compare these estimates with
our results found in Table 2. In particular, a baseline probability of 15% means that the odds of an
event are 15%85% = 0:176 47: Adding another 5% chance results in an event odds of
20%
80% = 0:25: This
means the impact of a CEO going to P = 1 from P = 0 results in an odds ratio of 0:250:176 47 = 1:
416 7: In other words, our linear specication estimates that a CEO going from equity compensation
consisting of all stock to all options increases the odds of an event by 41:67%, versus our panel
logit model, which predicts increased odds of 64:87%. Both of these estimates are substantial in
magnitude and both models report coe¢ cient estimates that are signicant at the 5% level.
Thus far, we have been using rm xed e¤ects to control for unobserved rm heterogeneity.
Recent nancial economic research suggests that not doing so can produce spurious results and
incorrect inferences (see Gormley and Matsa (2014)) . Nonetheless, if xed e¤ects are not called
for, we are, of course, using a less e¢ cient estimator, possibly failing to identify other important
e¤ects. We run a Hausman test to determine if a linear random e¤ects panel model would be
appropriate given that a linear xed e¤ect panel model is correct. Since we are using clustered
standard errors, it is important not to use the conventional Hausman test, which assumes i and
eit are i:i:d: but this is violated if clustered standard errors are appropriate for within-rm serial
8Recall that the odds of an event is calculated as Pr[Event=1]
Pr[Event=0]
: The odds ratio is the ratio of two odds.
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correlation. Instead we turn to the method of Wooldridge (2002) to accommodate our setting.
Results from this test report a Sargan-Hansen statistic of 113:50, which yields a p-value = 0:0000:
Hence, we can strongly reject the e¢ cacy of using a random e¤ects model for our empirical setting.
To consider the importance of larger versus small events, we return to our logit xed e¤ects panel
model and recode events as either bottom-quartile or top-quartile magnitude events. Magnitude is
again the total government nes imposed for an incident. Table 4 reports these results. Column
(1) contains the same specication reported in column (4) of Table 2, which contains all controls.
Column (2) shows us that if we dene events as only those in the smallest quartile magnitude-wise,
the point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The top quartile, however, has a
coe¢ cient estimate on P that is roughly twice that if we include all events: 1:13 vs. 0:53: This
estimate from column (3) suggests that a CEOs rm with an index P = 1 will have almost triple
the odds of breaking environmental law in the next year compared to a CEOs rm with an index
of P = 0.
We also conduct the same exercise with our linear xed e¤ect model so that we can include all
observations. Table 5 reports these results, which are similar to those in Table 4: the top-quartile
events are signicantly related to P; and the bottom ones are not. In sum, these ndings suggest
that in terms of incident rate, CEO compensation structure, as measured by P; is especially related
to high-stakes events.
2.1.3 Robustness Tests
If CEO compensation inuences environmental harm and disasters, it should not be the case that
this years odds of an event inuence next years compensation structure P: In order to this, we
rerun the specications in Table 2 with the modication that we measure P the year after rather
than the year before an event. As reported in Table 6, none of the specications are signicant.
Another natural question is to what extent compensation structure P is simply a proxy for
other important compensation variables. First, it could be that the total option awards currently
held by a CEO are what really matters in determining incident rates; last years option award
is simply a proxy for this larger value. Similarly, it could also be that the current total value of
stock held by the CEO is what really determines incident rates and P somehow proxies for this.
We explore these possibilities by rerunning the specication from Table 4 in column (3) (i.e., the
specication with all of our controls) and then adding controls for a CEOs value of total stock and
option awards currently held through the previous year, each logged.9 We report these results in
Table 7. For comparison purposes, column (1) replicates the results from column (3) in Table 4:
our baseline regression with all controls. Column (2) then adds lagged values for the log of total
stocks and options owned by the CEO. Surprisingly, neither regressor can help predict the odds
of an environmental event. Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient P changes little in estimate or signicance
when these additional controls are added.
9Specically, we calculate the log of the current total options and stock holdings as each ln (1 + V alue), where
Value is the value given by Execucomp for each of the total holding values. Execucomp includes zero values.
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Another potentially important measure of executive compensation is the CEOs Delta of her
options portfolio. Some argue that Delta should increase risk-taking, whereas others argue that it
should decrease risk-taking. This ambiguity arises both in the theory and empirical literature (see
Coles et al. (2006) and cites therein). For this paper, Delta is the dollar change in CEO wealth
as fa unction of a 1% change in stock price. We calculate the CEOs Delta for each executive in
our sample using the same method as in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002). The results of
adding this measure of Delta as a regressor are reported in column (3) : The coe¢ cient on Delta is
not statistically di¤erent from 0.10 The coe¢ cient on the index P is now slightly greater and even
more signicant at the 1% level.
A nal common measure of the nature of equity compensation, is Vega. This measures how much
of an increase in wealth a CEO receives with a 1% increase in her companys stock volatility. We
calculate this measure as in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002). All things equal, this measure
should be positively correlated with managerial risk-taking (see Coles et al. (2006)). However,
it should be positively correlated with managerial risk-taking that increases the companys stock
volatility. Column (4) reports that our coe¢ cient on Vega is positive but no di¤erent statistically
from zero. This suggests that while Vega tends to do well in capturing traditional measures of risk-
taking, it does not seem to capture increase risk of environmental harm. Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient
on our compensation index P becomes greater in magnitude and signicance than when we do not
control for Vega.
In total, it seems that our compensation index P is not simply a noisy proxy for measuring other
important executive-compensation measures. In fact, for our setting of the risk of environmental
harm, it seems to do a better job than the extant measures. In one sense this is not surprising, as
an increased risk of environmental harm, especially the kind that results in spectacular disasters,
could be considered more of an "o¤ balance sheet" risk. The conventional measures of managerial
risk-taking rm leverage, reduced cash surplus, R&D investment, reduced capital purchases, and
more-focused lines of business and acquisitions are all forms of risk-taking easily observable by
the nancial market and thus embedded in a companys stock return and volatility. In contrast,
managerial choices, such as shirking on oil-pipe inspections or choosing not to install automatic
shuto¤ valves on oil platforms, are much more di¢ cult for the market to identify and price into a
companys stock. Perhaps the index P can help on that dimension in predicting such risks.
2.1.4 Increased P Results in Increased magnitude of harm
For testing our second prediction, we use a similar specication to our linear panel model in the
previous section. However, we change our dependent variable from an event indicator to the log of
total government nes. We utilize the following model:
10Similar result are obtained by including separate measures for the executives stock and option deltas rather than
using the aggregate total.
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ln (1 + fine)it = i + 
Oi;t 1
Oi;t 1 + Si;t 1
+Xit + eit;
where fine is the total government ne assessed for the incident and all of the other regressors are
as they were in equation (2). Of course, since Prediction 2 is a conditional prediction, we now only
have observations for those rm-years that record an environmental incident. Our main coe¢ cient
of interest is again .
Table 8 reports the results for similar specications to those in Table 2. The rst three speci-
cations yield a signicant coe¢ cient on P at the 5% level. The nal specication with all controls
yields signicance at the 10% level. Since these are semi-elasticities, the coe¢ cient estimates sug-
gest that, roughly speaking, a CEO going from P = 0 to P = 1; conditional on experiencing an
event, will witness greater total event costs of 84% to 100%:
Since we are using a linear panel FE model, we again need to ask if it is the appropriate model
vis-a-vis a random e¤ects model. Conducting a Hausman test, as we did in our previous section,
we nd a SarganHansen statistic of 39:948 p-value =0:0008; which causes us to strongly reject the
null hypothesis that the random e¤ects model is appropriate given that the xed e¤ects model is
appropriate.
We again consider the comparison of the large and small events. Unfortunately, we now have a
signicantly reduced sample size compared to the previous section; thus, we now simply partition
nes into below median and above median nes. We use all of the controls used for the results
in column (4) of Table 8 for Table 9. For comparison purposes, column (1) in Table 9 replicates
the results in Column (4) of Table 8. We nd that using the sample of large (i.e., above median)
nes creates an estimate of the coe¢ cient on P signicant at the 5% level compared with a 10%
signicance level when using the sample of all nes. Further, the estimate using only larger nes is
over 50% greater in magnitude compared with the full sample that includes small nes. Meanwhile,
a sample of only small nes does not yield a signicant estimate of the coe¢ cient on P .
We also rerun the specication from column (4) in Table 8 with the addition of the natural
log of total company stock, options, Delta, and Vega. Again, none of these control variables are
signicant, and they do not materially change the results. Similarly, the current magnitude of an
event does not predict next years compensation structure P:
2.1.5 Selection vs. Incentives
Although it seems that higher P results in greater rates of and magnitudes of misconduct, it is not
clear if this is because of selection or incentives. It could be that rms that want to take on greater
risk of harm, attract those CEOs more willing to do so by o¤ering a higher P (as opposed to the
greater P incentivizing greater risk of harm). In an attempt to disentangle these two possibilities,
we conduct the same exercise as in the last two subsections, but now at the CEO-rm level. That
is, we use a xed e¤ect for each CEOrm pair, whereas before that xed e¤ect was at the rm
level. Thus, we will only be able to identify any e¤ect of P on environmental law-breaking by
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the variation of P while a particular CEO is at one particular rm. Although this approach will
potentially remove signicant variation from the analysis, it allows us to better identify the incentive
versus selection e¤ect. If there is no e¤ect of P at the CEOrm level, then we cannot rule out
that the e¤ects of P come through selection as opposed to incentives.
In Table 10, we report the results of both a logit and linear xed e¤ects model for the CEO
rm pair level. Now, the high-magnitude (i.e., top-quartile) events are signicant (at the 5% level).
Thus, identication is coming from the larger-stakes events, which parallels our earlier ndings
when analyzing the data at the rm rather than CEOrm level. In terms of magnitude of e¤ect,
the coe¢ cient estimates at the CEOrm level (when we include all events of all magnitudes) are
about half of the magnitude of those at the rm level. However, the top-quartile estimates are
similar for both levels of analysis.
In terms of P 0s e¤ect on the magnitude of an event, as reported in Table 11, the values are
similar. In terms of signicance, the CEOrm level has lower signicance for its estimates, which is
not a surprise since we are now only identifying these di¤erences from pay variation of a particular
CEO while at a single rm. The nal column with all controls has a p-value just short of 10%,
whereas all of the other specications carry p-values of less than 10%.
In sum, it seems that a substantial portion of the e¤ect identied earlier at the rm level is
also occurring at the CEOrm level, at least for the high-magnitude events. This suggests that
CEO compensation e¤ects on environmental law-breaking are occurring largely through incentive
provision (and not simply selection).
Despite all of the above ndings, it is possible the index P only predicts the incident rate
and magnitude of events for environmental harm and not other settings. To further explore this
possibility, we now analyze the index P in a di¤erent setting and di¤erent time period: nancial
accounting misconduct.
2.2 Executive Compensation and Financial Accounting Misconduct
Financial accounting represents another setting in which, similar to environmental harm, getting
caught for breaking accounting law can be viewed as a failed strategy that had a greater downside.
Firms can choose to be more aggressive in their accounting practices, magnifying their rms
nancial downside. In our setting, an event is an earnings restatement that results in an SEC
investigation. This means that we are really measuring the likelihood of breaking the law; to the
extent that being investigated by the SEC for suspicious nancial accounting is correlated with
greater risk-taking, we can conceptualize an SEC investigation as a signal of higher risk-taking.
The reason that we proceed with this section of analysis is many-layered. First, some studies
have shown that options pay is related to accounting misconduct (e.g., see Burns and Kedia [2006]
and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker [2010], and cites therein). Since we are using a new measure
of equity pay (i.e., P ), we want to examine if its use replicates past results obtained using other
measures. Second, restatements with SEC investigations are rare events: these carry less than a
0:5% annual incident rate in our dataset, which allows for testing our predictions in an entirely
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di¤erent setting from our environmental law-breaking one. Finally, at the end of 2005, it became
more costly to provide options due to FAS 123R.11 Our accounting data cover the period 2000
through 2011; hence, we can consider any di¤erential e¤ects of options before and after this policy
change, which is not possible with our environmental data since the database was discontinued after
2006. We can also consider any time-trend di¤erences between another major policy change (which
could a¤ect nancial accounting conduct): Sarbanes Oxley. Instead of directly shifting the cost
of providing options, as did FAS 123R, this policy essentially increased the penalty an executive
faced if he presided over a nancial accounting incident. With these policy changes, we can test
Hypotheses 5 and 6.
Our analysis proceeds just as before. However, our dependent variables are now di¤erent.
Specically, we obtain them from Audit Analytics, which reports accounting restatements and
whether or not these result in an investigation by the SEC. Restatements can be due to simple,
benign clerical errors or more serious actions, such as earnings manipulation. The most suspicious
of restatements are the ones, presumably, investigated by the SEC. Audit Analytics also reports
the net change in earnings of a restatement.
For this section, we employ a random e¤ects model instead of a xed e¤ects model. For our
linear model, we again conduct a Hausman test. We nd in this setting of nancial accounting
risk-taking, that if a xed e¤ects estimate model is appropriate, we cannot reject that a random
e¤ects model is inappropriate (p value of 0:53). However, since this then means the Random E¤ects
model is the more e¢ cient estimator, we turn to that model. For consistency, we also use a random
e¤ects model for the logit panel. In addition, if we used a xed e¤ect logit panel model, due to the
rare event nature of this sample, we would only be following 50 rms since the xed e¤ect model
must drop all rms that never have an event.
Table 12 reports our logit panel specications. Including all controls, as reported in column (3),
the coe¢ cient of 1:53 implies a CEO going from receiving all equity compensation in stock to all
in options (i.e., P = 0 to P = 1) will oversee a rm in the following year with some 362% increased
odds of a nancial accounting investigation. This coe¢ cient estimate on P is signicant at the 5%
level in column (3) and at the 1% level in the other columns.
Table 13 reports the same specications as in Table 12 but for a linear panel model. All
specications show the coe¢ cient estimates on P to be signicant at the 1% level and close to an
average value of 0:4%; which amounts to an 80% increase in the likelihood of a nancial accounting
event. Since incident rates are less than 1%; the increase in odds, as indicated by the odds ratio, is
similar to an increase in probability. Converting the 80% increase in chance to an odds ratio yields
1:81, which implies an 81% increased odds of an event. Thus, in contrast to our environmental
law-breaking setting, the linear estimator and logit estimator imply sharply di¤erent increases in
odds. When estimating low-probability events, the shape of the tail of the statistical distribution
clearly matters.
As mentioned, a nice feature of studying this accounting data, in addition to having a larger
11See Hayes et al. (2012) for a summary of this rule as it pertains to options accounting.
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sample, is that our time series passes through two signicant accounting policy changes. We had the
passage of both the SarbanesOxley Act (2002) and FAS 123R (2005). The former act essentially
created a larger expected penalty for CEOs involved in accounting misconduct. Our Hypothesis
5 predicts SarbanesOxley will have no e¤ect on risk-taking in equilibrium and thus will not be
associated with the incidence of restatements investigated by the SEC.
The FAS 123R policy change, in contrast, essentially made it more expensive for a rm to award
options. Hypothesis 6 predicts that a rule change like FAS123R should lower misconduct incident
rates
We consider these two policy changes with a simple, non-parametric time specication. Specif-
ically, we add an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for all years that the new policy
is e¤ective, which begins in 2002 for the SarbanesOxley Act and 2006 for FAS 123R. To limit
collinearity with our year xed-e¤ects, we create year xed-e¤ects from 2004 onward. We report
these results in Table 14. Columns (1) and (3) do not include year xed e¤ects and columns (2) and
(4) do. Coe¢ cient estimates on P are similar to those derived before3 adding such policy controls
and are signicant at the 5% (1%) level for the logit (linear) panel. It appears SarbanesOxley
had no e¤ect on alleged nancial accounting misconduct, at least in terms of SEC investigations.
Meanwhile, FAS 123R caused a signicant drop in accounting incident rates across all specications.
We now consider the magnitude of accounting restatements that are investigated by the SEC.
Accounting restatements can result in a positive or negative change in earnings. If we restrict
ourselves to those restatements that also have an SEC investigation, we have a mere 47 observations
with our specications and not enough power to identify a relationship between CEO compensation
and magnitude. Further, of these 47 observations, 22 have a net zero value in earnings restatement,
leaving only 25 observations to identify the magnitude of any possible e¤ect.
However, we can more loosely dene our event as a negative earnings restatement, rather than
one that also results in an SEC investigation. Doing so increases our observations to 283: In
contrast to our environmental incident data, accounting restatements are quite rare even for rms
that experience one. In fact, for our 12-year sample, for rms that face a restatement, 72:4% never
experience an additional restatement. If we only consider negative earnings restatements, then
82:1% of rms only experience one such event. Thus, when considering the conditional magnitude
of an event, our sample is similar to a cross section. Consequently, we implement an OLS model to
measure the relationship of rm compensation and earnings restatement magnitude. We also add
industry controls at the NAICS code two-digit level.
We do nd a relationship between compensation structure P and the magnitude of negative
earnings restatements. Table 15 reports these results. Since these are semi-elasticities, the magni-
tudes suggest that a CEO going from P = 0 to P = 1 will oversee a roughly 49% to 65% increase
in the magnitude of a negative earnings restatement, conditional on facing such a restatement.
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3 Conclusion
We explored how executive compensation a¤ects misconduct. To do so we constructed an index of
compensation called P; where increased P predicts a greater chance and magnitude of misconduct.
We tested these predictions in the setting of breaking environmental and accounting law. We found
that changing a CEOs compensation from 100% stock to 100% options (i.e., P = 0 to P = 1)
resulted in a 60% increased odds of environmental harm and close to a doubling of the magnitude
of harm. Similarly, for the same change in equity compensation, we found over 80% increased odds
that the rm has an accounting restatement that is investigated by the SEC. We also found that
the magnitude of negative earnings restatements increased by over 50%: We also found that the
e¤ect of P seems to be coming from an incentive e¤ect and not simply a selection e¤ect.
As far as policy, our results suggest that increasing the regulatory stick against top management
for failed risky-project outcomes does not change the incident rate nor the magnitude of loss.
Intuitively, making the stick larger does not change the rms level of desired downside exposure:
thus, the rm simply changes P to still induce the same level of exposure as it had before the
regulatory change. In contrast, making it more costly to provide a carrot (i.e., increasing the
relative cost of providing options) can reduce a rms choice of potential harm. We found evidence
that a rule change of adding a larger executive penalty SarbanesOxley did not a¤ect incident
rates, whereas a rule change making the higher powered incentives more costly to the rm FAS
123R successfully reduced incident rates.
In terms of managerial implications, we have explored a potential unintended consequence of
higher powered incentives, as captured by P : It is well established that high powered incentives
can increase positive rm outcomes, but it seems that they can also increase misconduct. Thus,
induced increased productivity must be weighed against potential harm (e.g., see Gino and Ariely
[2012] and Housman and Minor [2015]). This can be accomplished by simply o¤ering less high pow-
ered incentives than would have been o¤ered if not having considered their e¤ects on misconduct.
However, rms can also provide some opposing incentives to blunt the adverse e¤ects of nancial
incentives. For example, there is some evidence that adding incentives for positive sustainability
outcomes are e¤ectual (e.g., see Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim [2013] and Hong, Li, and Minor
[2015]). Nonetheless, not yet explored is how to match these di¤erent types of incentives; research
that considers the right mix of nancial and sustainability incentives could prove promising. That
is, exploring executive compensation more holisticallyin terms of seeking prot, limiting miscon-
duct, and enhancing sustainabilitycould provide important new insights. We hope to see such a
multi-dimensional approach in future research.
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4 Online Appendix
4.1 A Model of Executive Compensation and Misconduct
Our model is most similar in spirit to that of Edmans and Liu (2011) who assume that a rm must
incentivize its manager via debt and stock. Instead, we consider the two instruments to be stocks
and options. In addition, whereas they explore contract type as a function of the nature of the
rm, we have the di¤erent task of linking compensation structure to the outcomes of failures, both
in terms of frequency and magnitude. To ease exposition, we relegate proofs to the next section of
the appendix.
In our setting, the CEO must choose between a riskier project R and a safer project S: Let p
be the probability project R ( S) succeeds with the rm being worth VRS ( VSS); and 1   p the
chance it fails, providing a rm value of VRF ( VSF ): We could have di¤erent p0s for each project
type. Or we can simply redene rm value to make it equivalent to having the same p for both R
and S: To simplify exposition, we choose the latter approach. We also assume VRF is a random
variable whose realization is only observable by the CEO and is drawn from some commonly known
uniform distribution G distributed with support [0; VSF ]: If the the greatest downside project R is
chosen (i.e., VRF = 0); failure means that the rm is completely destroyed and becomes worth zero.
Finally, it is assumed that any rm-level penalty (e.g., regulatory nes) for a failure is incorporated
into the value VRF and VSF :
For some opportunities, it may be in the best interest of the rm for the CEO to choose a
project R over a safer project S. For instance, the principal of the rm will want the CEO to
choose R i¤ pVSS + (1  p)VSF  pVRS + (1  p)VRF ; which is equivalent to
0  p (VRS   VSS) + (1  p) (VRF   VSF ) : (3)
We denote the initial value of the rm as V0 and assume the ordering 0  VRF  VSF < V0 <
VSS < VRS : Thus, the value of the rm after a riskier success is the greatest, but a riskier failure
leaves the rm worth the least.
The following diagram summarizes the ending rm value Vij ;with the project type i 2 fRisky; Safeg
and outcome j 2 fSuccess; Failureg
The CEO is paid in equity compensation consisting of some portion of options and some portion
of stock. We normalize her salary to zero, since salary does not a¤ect project choices. Payo¤s for
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the CEO for each possible state of the world are as follows.
Payo¤ VRS VSS VSF VRF
Options  (VRS   V0)  (VSS   V0) 0   kVRF
Stocks VRS VSS VSF   kVRF
For the case of compensating a CEO in stock, she then simply receives fraction  of the rm, as
long as there is no riskier failure. The fraction  measures the level of option compensation to the
CEO. Typically executive option awards are issued close to "at the money," which, for our setting,
means that options only have value after a successful project outcome. Thus, the CEO receives
share  of the rms increase in value, which happens only when a project R or S succeeds.
Regardless of compensation structure, in the event of a riskier failure, VRF is realized and the
executive faces a penalty of  VRFk : This can be thought of as lost future income or reputation for
the CEO, as well as regulator nes and possible incarceration. This penalty is also increasing in
the magnitude of failure.
A CEO compensated solely by options will choose R when it has a positive expected payo¤ for
him: p (VRS   VSS)  (1  p) kVRF > 0: However, this will not be satised for some riskier projects
since we may have a realization as low as VRF = 0: A CEO who is compensated only via stocks
will choose R i¤ p (VRS   VSS)   (1   p)

VSF +
k
VRF

> 0: Again, since we can have VRF = 0;
the CEO will sometimes choose the safer project when paid all in stock.
For the CEO to choose the riskier project, it must be that the expected payo¤ from choosing
R is greater than the safer one, which can be written as
( 1  p)

VSF +
k
VRF

 p (+ ) (VRS   VSS) : (4)
The rm, meanwhile, will choose some cuto¤ value V RF such that the CEO chooses all riskier
projects R when eVRF  V RF and chooses S otherwise, where eVRF is the realization of the random
variable VRF . This means that with a realization of V RF ; the rm is indi¤erent between the CEO
choosing R and S; which happens when p (VRS   VSS) + (1   p) (V RF   VSF ) = 0: the expected
benet of choosing the riskier project equals the expected benet of choosing the safer one. This
implies that
V RF =
 p (VRS   VSS)
(1  p) + VSF : (5)
We refer to V RF as the risk-taking standard of the rm. We assume that the primitives of the
model take on values such that V RF =
 p(VRS VSS)
(1 p) + VSF > 0 so that we can rule out the case
where the riskier project is preferred by the rm for any possible realization of VRF ; if this were
true, riskier projects would always be chosen and there would be no project selection tension.
Finally, although riskier projects are not always preferred, they are still sometimes attractive.
Formally, we assume that (V0   VSF )  (VRS   VSS) : This inequality means that the additional
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gain from the success of a riskier project is at least as great in magnitude as the loss from an
unsuccessful safer project.
With these preliminaries, we can present the timeline of our stylized model:
1. The rm o¤ers the CEO an equity pay contract (i.e., stocks and options);
2. The CEO observes the return characteristics of each project and chooses one;
3. A project succeeds (fails) at probability p (1  p);
4. Payo¤s are realized.
In the next section, we analyze the rms decision problem and the ultimate contract o¤ered,
which we characterize in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 CEOs receive options share  =
V RF +
k
V 
RF
 V RF+VSF
Proof. See appendix
This  from Lemma 1 induces the CEO to implement the riskier project R if and only if it has
a higher expected net present value than the safer project S:
We next consider comparative statics to identify some testable empirical predictions. As shown
in the next section, the relationship of the share of options  o¤ered and a rms risk standard
V RF is nonmonotonic. However, for high-stakes environments (i.e., those settings for which the
rm faces signicant losses in the event of a riskier failure or the CEO faces a large penalty for a
riskier failure) we have the following ndings:
Proposition 2 Assuming high-stakes; an increase in option share increases the chance
q (1  p) of riskier failure and decreases the expected value of the rm upon a riskier failure
E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]:
Proof. See appendix
Thus, as a greater level of options are o¤ered to the CEO, we expect the chance of a riskier
failure to be greater and that such a failure will further reduce the value of the rm. To take
our predictions to the data, we link the outcome variable  in our theory to a simple, observable
variable. We call this new outcome variable the index P and dene it thus:
P  E[Voption]
E[Vstock] + E[Voption]
; (6)
which is the expected value of option awards divided by the expected value of option awards
and stock awards. In other words, P is the fraction of the value of equity compensation that the
CEO receives in the form of options, which is readily identied in our data. Our nal proposition
provides our empirical predictions linked to P :
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Proposition 3 Assuming high-stakes; an increase in the index P results in
1. an increase in the odds of a riskier failure;
2. an increase in the expected cost of riskier failure V0   E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]:
Proof. See appendix
4.2 Proofs
Lemma 1 CEOs receive options share  =
V RF +
k
V 
RF
 V RF+VSF
Proof: The rms problem is written as
max 
;
"
q (p (1    )VRS + pVo + (1  p)E[VRF jVRF > V RF ])
+ (1  q) (p (1    )VSS + pVo + (1  p) ((1  )VSF ))
#
;
subject to
 + kV RFVSF
+ 
 p
( 1  p)
VRS   VSS
VSF
;  +   1 and ;   0;
where we dene q  Pr(VRF  V RF ). We proceed by assuming, as in Edmans and Liu (2011), that
the rm induces the CEO to choose the rst-best policy (i.e., choose R if and only if its expected
value is greater than S): This adds the constraint
 + kV RFVSF
+ 
 p
( 1  p)
VRS   VSS
VSF
: (7)
The conditions  +   1 and ;   0 ensure no more than the entire rm is given away
and that only positive shares are given away.
The proof proceeds by rst assuming that the principal could directly choose V RF : Thus, con-
ditional on V RF ; q is xed and it can readily be shown that
@
@
<
@
@
< 0; (8)
which means that options are lower cost than stock as a form of executive compensation. However,
the principal cannot directly choose V RF but instead must induce the CEO to take on some risk
standard V RF : This is achieved through choosing  and  such that we meet inequality (7) : Since
it is costly for the rm to provide  and  , this constraint will bind. At  =  = 0; clearly (7)
is not met. At the extreme, if kV RFVSF
> p( 1 p)
VRS VSS
VSF
; then  = 1 will be chosen, as  is less
costly to the rm than . This is the case where k is so great that the rm cannot induce as much
risk-taking as it would like and thus must settle for a higher V RF than desired. In this setting, it
means that there is no relationship between changes in the primitives and (i.e., because  = 1
regardless of parameter perturbations). Thus, to explore interior solutions we now focus on those
cases where
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k <

p
( 1  p) (VRS   VSS)

V RF (9)
=

p
( 1  p) (VRS   VSS)
 p (VRS   VSS)
(1  p) + VSF

:
:
Note that less  than  is required to meet the inequality (7). Hence, since inequality (8) also
shows that  is less costly than , the rm will choose some  > 0 and  = 0: However, if we
assume some   0; 12 this means that the payment  is then
 =
 + kV RFVSF
p
( 1 p)
VRS VSS
VSF
  :
Recalling that V RF =
 p(VRS VSS)
(1 p) + VSF ; with further rearranging, our expression for the 

becomes
 =
V RF +
k
V RF
 V RF + VSF
: (10)
QED
Proposition 2 Assuming high-stakes (i.e., VSF (V RF )
2  < k (VSF   2V RF )) ; an increase in
option share increases the chance q (1  p) of riskier failure and decreases the expected value of
the rm upon a riskier failure E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]:
Proof: We rst show how  changes as V RF changes. We will then link this result to show
how changes in V RF a¤ect E[VRF jVRF > V RF ] and q (1  p) : We rst consider a change in V RF
originating from primitives other than VSF ; we will consider the case of VSF separately, since both
 and V RF are a function of VSF : Taking the derivative of 
 with respect to the risk standard
yields
@
@V RF
=
2kV RF + VSF (V

RF )
2    kVSF 
V RF
2   V RF + VSF 2 <> 0:
The sign of @

@V RF
is determined by the sign of 2kV RF + VSF (V

RF )
2    kVSF : In other words,
12Kadan and Swinkles (2008) similarly nd that rms should provide 100% options and no stocks unless the
rm has a substantial threat of bankruptcy, which does not generally include our empirical setting. Nonetheless, in
practice we often observe that equity compensation consists of stock, in addition to options, even for large, stable
rms. This could be driven by industry norms or a budget constraint for o¤ering options. It could also be driven
by convexity of cost in providing stocks and options, rather than the linear cost assumed above. Abstracting away
from the source, we assume that there is some minimum  such that rms need to provide some amount of stock to
managers. However, with  = 0; our following comparative statics still hold.
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 is non-monotonic in risk-taking. We will have @

@V RF
< 0 i¤
VSF (V

RF )
2  < k (VSF   2V RF ) : (11)
If  = 0; then this condition simplies to
2p (VRS   VSS)
(1  p) > VSF :
We refer to those settings where inequality (11) is met as the condition of high-stakes. This
inequality is met when the risk standard V RF is su¢ ciently low, which means that the expected
value of a riskier failure is su¢ ciently adverse. In addition, it also occurs with su¢ ciently high
penalty k to the CEO upon a riskier failure. If condition (11) is not met, then for this region of
parameters, the comparative statics are simply reversed.
It is also the case that d

dV RF
< 0: This can be seen by noting that
d
dVSF
=
 +  k
(V RF )
2
p
( 1 p) (VRS   VSS)
:
This expression is negative when  +  k
(V RF )
2 < 0; which occurs under high-stakes. That is, if
VSF (V

RF )
2  < k (VSF   2V RF ) then k > (V RF )2  , since VSF(VSF 2V RF ) > 1:
Now consider how lowering the risk standard V RF a¤ects E[VRF jVRF > V RF ] and q (1  p) :
It is trivial that E[VRF jVRF > V RF ] decreases as V RF decreases: decreasing V RF lowers the lower
bound of support of VRF while maintaining the same upper bound of support. It is not, however,
trivial that q (1  p) increases as V RF decreases; an increase in p lowers the risk-standard V RF ;
which means that q increases while (1  p) decreases. To determine the net e¤ect, note that
d
dp
(q(1  p)) = (VRS   VSS)
VSF
> 0:
We now combine these three comparative statics to conclude that if a rm lowers its risk
standard V RF ; option share 
 increases, the chance q (1  p) of a riskier failure increases, and the
expected value of the rm upon a riskier failure E[VRF jVRF > V RF ] decreases.
QED
Proposition 3 Assuming riskier projects are high-stakes; an increase in the index P results in
1. an increase in the odds of a riskier failure;
2. an increase in the expected cost of a riskier failure V0   E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]:
Proof:We must show that any change in P results in the same directional change in : Then,
using Proposition 2, along with noting that an increased chance of an event also means increased
odds and noting that the cost of a riskier failure (i.e., V0 E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]) is strictly decreasing
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in E[VRF jVRF > V RF ]; the proof is complete. The expected value of options compensation can be
written as
E[Voption] =  (qp (VRS   V0) + (1  q) p (VSS   V0))
=  (qpVRS + (1  q) pVSS   pV0) :
The expected value of compensation in stock is written as
E[Vstock] =  (qpVRS + (1  q) (pVSS + (1  p)VSF ))
=  (qpVRS + (1  q) pVSS   pV0 + pV0 + (1  q) (1  p)VSF ) :
Now consider the index P; which we dene as
P  E[Voption]
E[Vstock] + E[Voption]
: (12)
First note that holding all other variables xed; P is increasing in  since P < 1: Hence, we need
only to show that ddtE[Vstock]  ddtE[Voption]; where t is some parameter of E[Vstock] or E[Voption]
that also increases :13 Examination of E[Vstock] and E[Voption] shows that they are identical aside
from E[Vstock] containing an additional term pV0 + (1  q) (1  p)VSF . We want to show that
d
dt [pV0 + (1  q) (1  p)VSF ]  0. We see that excluding p; VSF and all of the parameters that
create q all reduce the value of pV0 + (1  q) (1  p)VSF as they also increase : Thus, we must
nally check that this term is (weakly) decreasing in p (since  is increasing in p) :
d
dp
[pV0 + (1  q) (1  p)VSF ]
= V0   (1  q)VSF   dq
dp
(1  p)VSF
= V0  

1  VSF   V

RF
VSF

VSF   dq
dp
(1  p)VSF
= V0  

V RF
VSF

VSF  
0@ 1(1 p)2 (VRS   VSS)
VSF
1A (1  p)VSF
= V0   V RF  
1
(1  p) (VRS   VSS)
= V0  
 p (VRS   VSS)
(1  p) + VSF

  1
(1  p) (VRS   VSS)
= V0   VSF   (VRS   VSS)
 0;
13 If a parameter (e.g., VSF ) decreases ; then take t to be its inverse (i.e., 1VSF ):
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where the nal inequality follows from (V0   VSF )  (VRS   VSS) : QED.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Event (1/0) 7705 15.04% 35.75% 0 1
Total Fines 1132 223,674$                 1,346,869$                1$                   25,000,000$                 
Index P  of Equity Comp 5999 75.08% 35.42% 0% 100%
Total Compensation (mm) 7628 6,257$                      12,758$                      -$               600,347$                       
KLD Environmental Strengths 7705 0.17 0.47 0.00 4.00
KLD Environmental Concerns 7705 0.32 0.80 0.00 6.00
Market Value 7704 11,261$                    31,666$                      0$                   507,217$                       
Market to Book Ratio 7696 2.51 1.62 1.00 28.88
Leverage 7465 0.21 0.18 0.00 4.91
Year 7705 n/a n/a 1996 2006
Index P is the ratio of CEO total options compensation divided by total options and stock compensation for a given year
An event is a company's environmental failure that breaches environmental law
Total fines are total government fines for the environmental failure
KLD Environmental Strengths and Concerns are a firm's environmental performance ratings and are provided by KLD Analytics
Compensation measures are from Execucomp and financial measures are from COMPUSTAT
  
Table 2: The Relationship of P and Environmental Events: Logit Panel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.4741** 0.4538* 0.5506** 0.5263**
(2.01) (1.92) (2.50) (2.19)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.582 -0.5719 -0.4946 -0.0205
(-1.50) (-1.45) (-1.22) (-0.05)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.52) (0.56) (0.31) (0.39)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.0287 -0.0011 -0.0223
(-0.15) (-0.01) (-0.12)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.0958 -0.0887 -0.0464
(-0.73) (-0.63) (-0.31)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 1750 1750 1715 1715
Standard errors  are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
z statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
Table 3: The Relationship of P and Environmental Events: Linear Panel Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.0497** 0.0478* 0.0563** 0.0492*
(2.03) (1.94) (2.26) (1.89)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.0552 -0.0538 -0.0515 -0.0070
(-1.44) (-1.40) (-1.29) (-0.18)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.66) (0.69) (0.46) (0.84)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.0046 -0.0032 -0.0058
(-0.14) (-0.10) (-0.19)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.0207 -0.0199 -0.0129
(-0.75) (-0.72) (-0.48)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 5108 5108 4938 4938
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
t statistics reported in parentheses
Table 4: Relationship of P and High vs. Low Magnitude Events: Logit Panel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.5263** -0.0080 1.1344**
(2.17) (-0.02) (2.53)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.0205 -0.4442 1.2405
(-0.05) (-0.69) (1.60)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.34) (0.39) (-0.80)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.0223 -0.2229 -0.3810
(-0.11) (-0.92) (-1.51)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.0464 -0.0223 -0.2872*
(-0.33) (-0.11) (-1.73)
Incident Magnitude All 4th Q 1st Q
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1715 895 749
Standard errors  are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
z statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
Table 5: Relationship of P and Large vs. Small Magnitude Events: Linear Panel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Index P of Equity Comp at t-1 0.0492* 0.0019 0.0388**
(1.89) (0.11) (2.30)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.0070 -0.0179 0.0297
(-0.18) (-0.76) (1.27)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.84) (0.66) (-0.84)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.0058 -0.0129 -0.0230
(-0.19) (-0.77) (-1.19)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.0129 -0.0013 -0.0252
(-0.48) (-0.10) (-1.36)
Incident Magnitude All 4th Q 1st Q
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 4938 4938 4938
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
t statistics reported in parentheses
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level
Table 6: Falsification Test of the Relationship of P and Incident Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t+1 0.2379 0.2310 0.2287 -0.2439
(0.93) (0.94) (0.92) (-0.90)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.4983 -0.4835 -0.4057 0.0547
(-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.10) (0.15)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.70) (0.59) (0.47) (0.68)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.0761 -0.0101 -0.2137
(-0.27) (-0.03) (-0.82)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.0833 -0.0853 -0.0361
(-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.21)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 1401 1401 1377 1377
Standard errors  are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
z statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
Table 7: Additional Compensation Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 1.1344** 1.0940** 1.5370*** 1.3681***
(2.39) (2.34) (2.86) (2.64)
Ln(Total Stock Value) at t-1 0.0816
(0.63)
Ln(Total Option Value) at t-1 -0.0373
(-0.62)
Total Delta at t-1 -0.0004
(-0.94)
Total Vega at t-1 0.0011
(0.65)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 749 705 724 724
Standard errors  are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
z statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Top Quartile Environmental Incident (1,0)
Table 8: Relationship of P and Magnitude of Environmental Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.9963** 0.9607** 0.9967** 0.8395*
(2.28) (2.16) (2.21) (1.88)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.5022 0.5219 0.6176 0.6379
(0.64) (0.67) (0.78) (0.78)
Total Compensation at t-1 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.95) (-0.78) (-0.48) (-0.44)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.1435 -0.1470 -0.1184
(-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.39)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.2292 -0.2349 -0.1555
(-0.94) (-0.94) (-0.63)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 820 820 813 813
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: ln(1+total government fines)
t statistics reported in parentheses
Table 9: Relationship of P and Magnitude of Events (Large vs. Small) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.8395* 0.2824 1.3531**
(1.88) (0.52) (2.22)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.6379 -0.6099 0.5767
(0.78) (-0.64) (0.73)
Total Compensation at t-1 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.44) (0.05) (-0.76)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.1184 -0.2716 -0.2861
(-0.39) (-0.91) (-1.00)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.1555 0.0779 0.0134
(-0.63) (0.42) (0.04)
Incident Magnitude All <Median >Median
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 813 410 403
t statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: ln(1+total government fines)
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level
Table 10: Incentive Effects on Incident Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.2646 -0.1808 1.2633** 0.0262 -0.0057 0.0403**
(0.98) (-0.40) (2.51) (0.92) (-0.26) (2.50)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.0973 -0.1382 1.5453 0.0052 -0.0029 0.0255
(0.20) (-0.18) (1.53) (0.12) (-0.11) (0.93)
Total Compensation at t-1 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.03) (0.32) (-0.70) (0.25) (0.58) (-0.75)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 -0.2304 -0.7859** -0.3553 -0.0223 -0.0378* -0.0212
(-0.90) (-2.10) (-1.14) (-0.63) (-1.91) (-0.91)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.3101* -0.2413 -0.5099** -0.0406 -0.0168 -0.0381
(-1.75) (-0.90) (-2.32) (-1.33) (-0.87) (-1.64)
Model Logit FE Logit FE Logit FE Linear FE Linear FE Linear FE
Incident Magnitude All 4th Q 1st Q All 4th Q 1st Q
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1297 635 538 4938 4938 4938
Dependent Variable: Environmental Incident (1,0)
z or t  statistics reported in parentheses for logit and l inear models, respectively
Logit panel standard errors  are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Linear panel standard errors are clustered at the firm-ceo pair level
Table 11: Incentive Effects on Event Magnitudes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 1.0721* 1.0595* 1.0720* 0.9036
(1.81) (1.77) (1.80) (1.50)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 -0.0891 -0.0538 -0.0707 -0.1659
(-0.08) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.15)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.32) (0.34) (0.31) (0.36)
KLD Env Strengths at t-1 0.0608 0.0335 0.0851
(0.14) (0.08) (0.19)
KLD Env Concerns at t-1 -0.1534 -0.1733 -0.1711
(-0.53) (-0.60) (-0.62)
Firm-CEO Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Env Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 726 726 722 722
standard errors are clustered at the firm-ceo pair level
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: ln(1+total government fines)
t statistics reported in parentheses
Table 12: The Relationship of P and Financial Accounting Events: Logit Panel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 2.1446*** 2.4711*** 1.5317**
(3.27) (3.61) (2.14)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.5291 1.0544 0.8040
(0.86) (1.59) (1.27)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.32) (0.11) (0.05)
Firm Random Effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
N 13586 13098 13098
z statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Accounting Incident (1,0)
standard errors are bootstrap (400 repetitions)
accounting incident is a restatement that is investigated by the SEC
Table 13: The Relationship of P and Financial Accounting Events: Linear Panel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.0058*** 0.0066*** 0.0037***
(4.72) (4.74) (2.94)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.0013 0.0029 0.0025
(0.53) (1.11) (0.93)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.75) (0.58) (0.43)
Firm Random Effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
N 13586 13098 13098
t statistics reported in parentheses
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Accounting Incident (1,0)
standard errors  are clustered at the firm level
accounting incident is a restatement that is investigated by the SEC
Table 14: The Effect of Policy Changes on Potential Accounting Misconduct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 1.4684* 1.5304** 0.0036*** 0.0037***
(1.91) (2.14) (2.78) (2.94)
Post Sarbanes Oxley (1,0) -0.2472 -0.2429 -0.0026 -0.0021
(-0.70) (-0.55) (-0.87) (-0.65)
Post FAS 123R (1,0) -1.7002*** -23.3559*** -0.0048*** -0.0062***
(-3.04) (-15.26) (-3.97) (-3.77)
Panel Regression Model Logit Logit Linear Linear
Firm Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
N 13098 13098 13098 13098
z or t  statistics reported in parentheses for logit and l inear models, respectively
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: Accounting Incident (1,0)
Standard errors  for logit are calculated via bootstrap method (400 repetitions)
Standard errors  for l inear are clustered at the firm level
accounting incident is a restatement that is investigated by the SEC
Table 15: Relationship of P and Magnitude of Financial Accounting Events 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index P  of Equity Comp at t-1 0.6489** 0.6524** 0.4869 0.5429
(2.15) (2.29) (1.62) (1.63)
Equity Comp % of Total Comp  at t-1 0.7070 0.7724* 0.7648* 0.6918
(1.45) (1.73) (1.75) (1.23)
Total Compensation at t-1 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000**
(3.71) (1.95) (1.81) (2.53)
Regression Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No no Yes
N 283 274 274 274
robust standard errors
* p<0.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01
Dependent Variable: ln(1+abs(negative earnings restatement))
t statistics reported in parentheses
